MORAL OBLIGATIONS STRENGTHEN THE UNBALANCED AND FRAGILE CONTRACTUAL SOCIAL EXCHANGES BETWEEN ACTORS AT WEDDING CEREMONIES

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ABSTRACT
This research aimed to describe the social exchange pattern by Reward and Punishment in Surakarta City. This study was descriptive qualitative research, following quasi-experiment thinking logic, conducted twice on two different wedding ceremonies. Informants were taken using purposive sampling technique, chosen based on the shared domicile area, having intensive interaction in a relatively long period, and experiencing two ceremonies periods. The domicile in Jebres Citizen Association with intensive interaction in the 21 years (2000-2021). Data analysis was conducted interactively in data collection, data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing. Primary data was collected using in-depth interview on 23 informants, consisting of 16 main informants (8 inviters and 8 invited persons) and 7 supporting informants. Triangulation was conducted through interviewing 7 informants. The unbalanced exchange showed that actors with higher economic position do not give larger nominal contribution value to the lower one, but instead, the actor with lower position gives relatively larger nominal contribution value proportionally to the higher actor. The exchanges dimensions tend to be contractual, unbalanced and fragile. The sustainability of social exchange is carried out by strengthening moral obligations.

KEYWORDS: reward and punishment, contractual exchange, unbalance exchange, strengthening moral obligation

INTRODUCTION
Social exchange pattern (Davlembayeva et al., 2020) within society is conducted along its life cycle stages – from birth, marriage (Cherlin, 2020) to death (Utomo, 2005). The social exchange between actors in giving and receiving (Kim et al., 2018) wedding contribution within society has been a habit sent down from one generation to the next (Bagus Haryono, et al, 2020). The activity of giving and receiving contribution (Befu, 1968) becomes sumbang-menyumbang (contributing-to-each other) tradition, commonly done by most Indonesians, despite different terms (Purwadi, 2005). Sumbang-menyumbang activity existing in Java is identified, by (Geertz, 1983; Soetji Lestari, 2012), with varying terms. In Central Java Province, particularly in Surakarta – it is called njagong, while it is called kondangan in Yogyakarta, and de-nyande in Madura, mbecek (Ponorogo), and gantangan in West Java (Subang Region). Particularly in Surakarta, Njagong activity keeps developing into a tradition, as it is a habit (Cary Wu and Rima Wilkes, 2016), to perpetuate reciprocal exchange process
conducted along with the life of two actors within society, sent down to their children and descents. The contribution is generally made during the wedding ceremony, but it may occur before and after the ceremonies. The form of contribution can be varying, in addition to exchange resource that is economical and non-economical, it can be cash, product and or service (Bignoux, 2006). The contribution to urban people is generally in cash form. However, it can be some products very useful to support the wedding ceremony (Elsie Clews Parsons S, 2020) (Probert & Saleem, 2018). The food materials contributed to the wedding ceremony are usually raw material such as egg, rice, sugar, tea, noodle, bihun, tempe, cabbage, chili, and cooking oil. The contribution is usually given during wedding ceremony, but some of it can be given before or after the ceremony. The size of the contribution is also varying, recalling it generally indicates an individual’s social degree (high, medium, low). The size of the contribution is also varying according to the social closeness between actors (giver and receiver of contribution) (Aknin & Human, 2015). The size of contribution given to neighbour is not always as same as that given to a friend, colleague, and relatively based on lineage or kinship (Santasombat, 2008). Contribution exchange during njagong is a rational action when an individual repays an amount of contribution, he/she has ever received, they estimate the value equivalent to the contribution they have ever received before. In determining the size of the contribution, the actor has calculated or anticipated the receivers’ opportunity of repaying it later.

The anticipation of contribution repayment motivates an individual to give (to contribute), with an expectation that the receiver will repay it later (Jung et al., 2014). Even an individual is motivated to establish new relations, by contributing to another – although they have not had been acquainted closely with each other because accidentally he/she is his/her friends’ colleagues. The process will keep affecting many more people to start contributing in their attempt to expanding their relation (Dijkstra, 2015). The size of any contribution received by an individual is often followed with the pride inside the receiver, as it reflects how broad the network (Dykstra et al., 2016) he/she has been established is. *Sumbang-menyumbang* activity conducted by society is the manifestation of rational exchange social (Ariel Rubinstein, n.d.). In *sumbang-menyumbang* activities, the one having ever given contribution will expect the one having ever been given contribution (reward) to repay it (Burgess, 1982) in the same or larger nominal amount in a different time.

Graycar & Jancsics (2016), and Mauss (2002) explained three types of moral obligation (Review, 2020) maintaining contribution: obligations of giving, of receiving, and of repaying (Li et al., 2017). If the one having ever been contributed (rewarded) does not do so, punishment (Cho et al., 2009) will befall him/her. Besides, people tend to maximize reward and to minimize punishment. This activity occurs hereditarily in varying patterns of reward (Fellgett, 1975) and punishment (Kirtley, 2020). SEPRAP (Social Exchange Pattern by Reward and Punishment) in wedding ceremonies in Surakarta city is interesting to study because despite belonging to urban society generally relying more on cash as the main exchange value in *sumbang-menyumbang*, the exchange of product and service still occurs (Peregrin, 2019). Furthermore, what are SEPRAP variations occurring between the same actors in different period of time in wedding ceremonies in Surakarta City? The *sumbang-menyumbang* activity
in the wedding ceremony was originally encouraged by a wish to help each other. Those with higher income should give a larger amount of help to those with lower income, but does it occur as expected? Are sumbangan (contribution) defined as an individual’s pure wish to give help, not binding, or is there moral obligation binding? (Hadarics & Kende, 2018) If it becomes a social exchange activity, does it build on social consideration or does it become economic consideration with the profit-loss calculation? How are social exchange patterns performed by actors – in which the two actors are related to each other symmetrically or dependent asymmetrically or unbalance exchange on work relation?

MATERIALS AND METHODS
This study on reward and punishment was a descriptive qualitative research, following experiment logic, particularly quasi-experiment design (Berninghaus et al., 2008). This research built on a philosophy based on an assumption that on the one hand human beings actually become active, dynamic, and creative subjects to build their social interaction network, but on the other hand their social behaviour is also limited by (either written or non-written) consensus about reward and punishment existing within the society itself. This thought emphasizes the importance of rational human interacting with their fellow humans repeatedly. Human beings are understood as rational human (Marcus, 2012), recalling their behaviour is always guided by rational (profit-loss) consideration by attempting to maximize the opportunity (Kaplan, 2019) of getting reward and to minimize the probability of getting punishment. Interhuman behaviour is conducted repeatedly and thereby creating a consistent pattern. Thus, interhuman behaviour will keep following consistency principle, by repeating the activities generating reward (return, retribution, profit, positive praise, social approval, and reinforcement), and not repeating the activities generating punishment - punishment, loss, high cost (Khalid & Ali, 2017) and social sanction (García and Wei, 2013). Paradigmatically, the explanation of interhuman interaction follows social behaviour paradigm, referring to Peter Blau (1964) and George Homans’ (1958, 1961) social exchange theory (Chernyak-Hai & Rabenu, 2018). To explore the objective of the study on reward and punishment occurring repeatedly with social exchange theory analysis, longitudinal research should be conducted, requiring several-time (at least twice) research. The quantitative research method chosen is generally experimented one. This research on reward and punishment particularly follows a quasi-experiment design by conducting a twice research: when the first actor held the first wedding ceremony and when the first actor held the second wedding ceremony. The first research was conducted when the first actor held the second wedding ceremony. The first research was conducted when the first actor distributed invitation of the first wedding ceremony (IFA-1 is assumed to be pretest). The second research was conducted when the first actor gave an invitation (Ballesta et al., 2019) to his second wedding ceremony (IFA-2 is assumed to be posttest). The first research was conducted when the second actor received the invitation for the first wedding ceremony (ISA during IFA-1). The second research was conducted when the second actor received the invitation for the second wedding ceremony (ISA during IFA-2).
This longitudinal research found four social exchange patterns by reward and punishment because each actor always behaves rationally by always evaluating the cost (loss) resulting from the treatment he/she gives or receives. Profit and loss can be found out by individual actors through calculating the size of reward and punishment received or given in the first and second times. Individual actors will always evaluate the profit-loss of treatment, for the sake of maintaining the sustainability of the next social exchange pattern. Social exchange patterns occurring are still maintained by individual actors and even forwarded to the next generation. The work to which the framework refers mainly, following this social behaviour paradigm (exemplar) building on BF Skinner’s behaviourism thinking (1976) and George Homan’s Social Exchange. The exemplar (Austin, 2017), despite classical work, is still relevant to the condition of society today. Therefore, the author keeps using old Social Exchange theory (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005) in this study to analyze the reality occurring today, because the author assumes that the theory is still relevant to the present time and expectedly still surviving in the future.

However, the novelty to be raised in this study is not only the use of old theory but the analysis of the new real reality of present society. Referring to Müller-Bloch and Kranz (2014) suggesting 7 separate novelties (evidence, knowledge, practice, methodology, empiric, theoretical, and population, the novelty raised in this research is rational reason prioritizing utilitarianism for the sake of pragmatic interest, to construct idealism displaying clear sociological thinking plot from philosophy to exemplar to which the sociological analysis refers. It means constructing chronological thinking from philosophical (interactionist), paradigmatic (social behaviour), leading to theory options (Peter Blau, 1964) and Emerson’s Social Exchange, 1981), quantitative method and statistic (experiment) technique and exemplar (BF Skinner’s Behaviorism, 1976) and George Homan’s Social Exchange) to which this paradigm refers. Particularly, it can be seen in concrete social reality (wedding ceremonies based on reward and punishment, predictably will be very useful to sociological development in the future.

The informant is determined using purposive sampling technique in which the informants were selected based on shared domiciling area and intensive interaction for a relatively long period, and having been invited to attend wedding ceremonies at least twice. Furthermore, 16 informants were selected, those living in the same neighbourhood, i.e. in Citizen Association (RW) 20 Jebres-Surakarta, having intensive interaction for 21 years (2000-2021), and having ever invited the people to attend their wedding ceremonies (Thoen, 2020), at least twice (the first and the second). The neighbour informants domicile in Citizen Association (RW) 20 Jebres-Surakarta, having intensive interaction for about 20 years and having been invited to attend wedding ceremonies at least twice. Data analysis was conducted interactively in data collection, data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing (Miles and Huberman). To validate data, an interview was conducted with 6 informants constituting chiefs of Neighborhood Association (RT) and 1 chief of Citizen Association, and Family Card data was crosschecked. Primary data was collected through in-depth interviewing 23 informants consisting of
16 main informants and 7 informants functioning to be triangulation. Secondary data was collected from documentation of family card data functioning to be triangulation as well.

RESULT
Reward to be (having been) gotten by inviter/the first actor in the first ceremony (IFA-1) and punishment to be (having been) given by the invited one/second actor (ISA), creating social exchange pattern by unique reward and punishment (SEPRAP) can be seen in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Social Exchange Pattern by Reward and Punishment (SEPRAP) between IFA and ISA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Punishment to be (having been) given by the invited one/second actor (ISA)</th>
<th>Reward</th>
<th>Reward to be (having been) gotten by inviter/the first actor in the first ceremony (IFA-1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low (present/attending)</td>
<td>High (Because having invited)</td>
<td>I: an ideal one, in which the lower punishment given by ISA, the higher is the reward favourable to IFA-1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher (absent/not attending)</td>
<td>Low (none) (because having never invited)</td>
<td>II: the lower the ISA’s punishment, the higher is the reward gotten by IFA-1.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the first quadrant, invited by IFA-1, ISA attends the invitation. IFA-1 invites ISA expected to attend the first wedding ceremony he/she has planned, and ISA fulfils his/her invitation. The presence/attendance of ISA can be defined as the ISA’s lower punishment, highly expected to increase the reward he/she gets. This pattern creates a symmetrical/reciprocal relation. It becomes the first pattern in which ISA’s punishment is lower (none), increasing Reward gotten by IFA-1. This SEPRAP is the ideal one, in which the lower the Punishment is given by ISA, the higher is the reward favourable to IFA-1. In the second quadrant, despite not invited by IFA-1, ISA remains to attend the ceremony. IFA-1 does not invite ISA expectedly not attending the first ceremony planned; however, instead, ISA attends his/her first ceremony. As long as the consumption supply is still adequate (not embarrassing), the presence of ISA does not generate some problem to IFA-1; therefore, ISA’s presence can be conceived as surprising punishment to IFA-1, although it instead becomes favourable to him/her. The presence/attendance of ISA, actually unexpected by IFA-1, creates the second SEPRAP that is asymmetrical (Ramirez & Legendre, 2018) or non-reciprocal or unbalance exchange. In this second SEPRAP, there should not be reward gotten by IFA-1 (when ISA imposes high punishment by not attending the ceremony). Thus, in this second SEPRAP, the lower the punishment is given by ISA, the higher is the reward received by IFA-1.)
In the third quadrant, despite invited by IFA-1, ISA does not attend the ceremony. IFA-1 invites ISA to his/her first ceremony. To increase reward to IFA-1, ISA is expected to attend his/her first ceremony’s invitation. However, ISA does not attend IFA-1’s invitation. This third SEPRAP has an asymmetrical and non-reciprocal pattern, tending to lead to poor SEPRAP between both of them. As a result, when seeing each other, they will tend to be silent or to express varying reasons (formal reason, forgetting, Covid-19, etc). In this third SEPRAP, IFA-1 should get higher reward with the lower punishment. However, it does not occur because instead, IFA-1 got higher punishment from ISA, thereby getting the lower (no) reward. In this third SEPRAP, the higher is the punishment given by ISA the higher the reward IFA-1 gets.

In the fourth quadrant, IFA-1 does not invite ISA and ISA does not attend the event. Indeed IFA-1 does not invite ISA in his/her first ceremony, and ISA does not attend it. The reality shows that a neutral social relation is established between them without prejudice. This fourth SEPRAP becomes an exchange pattern creating an ideal SEPRAP that is symmetrical and reciprocal. IFA-1 should not get a reward (lower), because ISA is not present in the ceremony (high punishment). In this fourth SEPRAP, the higher the punishment imposed by ISA, the lower is the reward received by IFA-1.

Furthermore, the reward to be (having been) gotten by inviter/the first actor in the second ceremony (IFA-2) and punishment to be (having been) given by the invited one/second actor (ISA), creating social exchange pattern by reward and punishment (SEPRAP) can be seen in table 2 below.

**Table 2. Social Exchange Pattern by Reward and Punishment (SEPRAP) between IFA-2 and ISA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Punishment to be (having been) given by the invited one/second actor (ISA)</th>
<th>Reward</th>
<th>Reward to be (having been) gotten by inviter/the first actor in the second ceremony (IFA-2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low (present/attending)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>I the first pattern, in which the lower punishment given by ISA, the higher is the reward gotten by IFA-2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>II the reality shows that the lower the reward, the lower is the punishment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher (absent/not attending)</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>the higher the punishment imposed by ISA, the lower is the reward gotten by IFA-2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>the higher the ISA’s punishment, the lower is the reward received by IFA-1.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the first quadrant, invited by IFA-2, ISA attends the invitation. IFA-2 invites ISA expected to attend the second wedding ceremony he/she has planned, and ISA fulfils his/her invitation. The presence/the attendance of ISA is highly expected by IFA-2, thereby creating symmetric/reciprocal pattern. It
becomes the first pattern, in which ISA’s presence is conceived as ISA’s lower (no) punishment, thereby improving the reward gotten by IFA-2. Thus, it becomes an ideal SEPRAP in which the lower the punishment imposed by ISA, the higher is the reward favourable to IFA-2. In the second quadrant, despite not invited by IFA-2, ISA remains to attend the ceremony. IFA-1 does not invite ISA expectedly not attending the first ceremony planned; however, instead, ISA attends his/her first ceremony. As long as the consumption supply is still adequate (not embarrassing), the presence of ISA does not generate some problem to IFA-2; therefore, ISA’s presence can be conceived as surprising punishment to IFA-2, although it instead becomes favourable to him/her. The presence/attendance of ISA, actually unexpected by IFA-2, creates the second SEPRAP that is asymmetrical or non-reciprocal. In this second SEPRAP, there should not be reward gotten by IFA-2 (when ISA imposes higher punishment). However, no punishment imposed by ISA instead gives IFA-2 a space to improve its reward. IFA-2 should not get a reward as he/she does not invite ISA. In other words, the higher the punishment, the lower will be the reward. However, the lower reward is followed by lower punishment. It means that IFA-2’s opportunity of getting a reward is higher when punishment imposed by ISA is getting lower. In this second SEPRAP, the lower the punishment given by ISA, the higher is the reward gotten by IFA-2. In the third quadrant, despite invited by IFA-2, ISA does not attend the ceremony. IFA-2 invites ISA to his/her second ceremony. To increase reward to IFA-2, ISA is expected to attend his/her second ceremony’s invitation. However, ISA does not attend IFA-1’s invitation. This third SEPRAP has an asymmetrical and non-reciprocal pattern, tending to lead to poor SEPRAP between both of them. As a result, when seeing each other, they will tend to be silent or to express varying reasons (formal reason, forgetting, Covid-19, etc). In this third SEPRAP, IFA-2 should get a higher reward when ISA imposes lower punishment. However, it does not occur because instead, IFA-1 got higher punishment from ISA, thereby getting a lower (no) reward. In this third SEPRAP, the higher the punishment given by ISA the higher is the reward IFA-2 gets.

In the fourth quadrant, IFA-2 does not invite ISA and ISA does not attend the ceremony. Indeed IFA-1 does not invite ISA in his/her first ceremony, and ISA does not attend it. The symmetrical and reciprocal relation pattern (reality occurring) makes the social relation neutral so that they see each other ordinarily without prejudice. This fourth SEPRAP becomes an exchange pattern creating an ideal SEPRAP that is symmetrical and reciprocal. IFA-2 should not get a reward (lower), because ISA is not present in the ceremony (high punishment). In the ideal SEPRAP, the higher the punishment imposed by ISA, the lower is the reward received by IFA-2. Furthermore, the reward to be (having been) gotten by inviter/second actor having ever (having never) attended the first inviter/first actor’s invitation to the first ceremony (IFA-1) and punishment to be given by IFA-1 can be seen in table 3 below.
Table 3. Social Exchange Pattern by Reward and Punishment (SEPRAP) between ISA and IFA-1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Punishment from the inviter (IFA-1)</th>
<th>Reward from the invited one (ISA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inviting</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expecting to get a reward from the one ever inviting (expected)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Symmetrical Reciprocal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not inviting/forgetting to invite</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(interaction, keeping silent, reason)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(naturally), The reciprocal, symmetrical, formal reason</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the first quadrant, invited by ISA, IFA-1 attends the invitation. ISA invites IFA-1 expected to attend the first wedding ceremony, and IFA-1 fulfils his/her invitation. The presence/attendance of IFA-1 can be defined as the IFA-1’s lower punishment, highly expected by ISA to increase the reward he/she gets. This pattern creates symmetrical/reciprocal relation in which IFA-1’s punishment is lower (none), increasing Reward gotten by ISA. This first SEPRAP is the ideal one, in which the lower the punishment is given by IFA-1, the higher is the reward favourable to ISA.

In the second quadrant, despite not invited by ISA, IFA-1 remains to attend the ceremony. ISA does not invite IFA-1 as he/she is unexpected to attend ISA’s first ceremony planned, but instead, ISA attends the ceremony. As long as the consumption supply is still adequate (not embarrassing), the presence of IFA-1 does not generate some problem to ISA; therefore, IFA-1’s presence can be conceived as surprising punishment to ISA, although it instead becomes a favorable reward to him/her. The presence/attendance of IFA-1, actually unexpected by ISA, creates the second SEPRAP that is asymmetrical. In this second SEPRAP, the presence of IFA-1 has improved reward to ISA. It means that the lower the punishment is given by IFA-1, the higher is the reward received by ISA.

In the third quadrant, despite ISA’s invitation, IFA-1 does not attend the ceremony. ISA invites IFA-1 to come to his/her first ceremony. To increase reward to ISA, IFA-1 is expected to attend his/her first ceremony’s invitation. However, IFA-1 does not attend ISA’s invitation. This third SEPRAP is an asymmetrical and non-reciprocal pattern, tending to lead to poor SEPRAP between both of them. As a result, when seeing each other, they will tend to be silent or to express varying reasons (formal reason, forgetting, Covid-19, etc). In this third SEPRAP, IFA-1 should come (punishment is getting lower), so that reward obtained ISA will increase. However, ISA’s expectation to improve reward disappears, as he/she instead gets higher punishment from IFA-1 (not present). In this third SEPRAP, the higher the reward ISA expects, the higher is the punishment given by IFA-1.
In the fourth quadrant, ISA does not invite IFA-1 and IFA-1 does not attend the ceremony. Indeed, ISA does not invite IFA-1 in his/her first ceremony, and IFA-1 does not attend it. The reality shows that a still neutral social relation is established between them without prejudice. This fourth SEPRAP creates an ideal SEPRAP that is symmetrical and reciprocal. ISA should not get a reward (lower) from IFA-1, because ISA is not present in the ceremony (high punishment). In this fourth SEPRAP, the higher the punishment imposed by IFA-1, the lower is the reward received by ISA.

**DISCUSSION**

Reward to be (having been) gotten by the second one/actor having ever/have never attended in the second inviter/actor’s invitation to his/her second ceremony (IFA-2) and punishment to be (having been) given by IFA-2 can be seen in table 3 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAPD’s Punishment</th>
<th>Reward</th>
<th>ISA’s Reward</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>present/attending (the ceremony held by inviter having ever attended his/her ceremony)</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>His/her presence is expected, occurring symmetrically reciprocally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unexpected for his/her presence, because he/she has never been present before, asymmetrical relation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not present / not attending (the ceremony held by inviter having never attended his/her ceremony)</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>Poor asymmetric interaction occurs, silence, looking for a formal or reasonable reason such as covid-19 pandemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Natural, reciprocal, symmetrical, reason rationalization before previous moral duty (debt of gratitude)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the first quadrant, invited by ISA, IFA-2 attends the invitation. ISA invites IFA-2 expected to attend his/her second ceremony, and IFA-2 fulfils his/her invitation. The presence/the attendance of IFA-2 is highly expected, thereby creating symmetrical relation being the first pattern in which IFA-2’s presence (lower punishment) increases the reward ISA gets. Thus, it becomes an ideal SEPRAP, in which the lower the Punishment given by IFA-2 (none), the higher is the reward favourable to ISA.

In the second quadrant, despite not invited by ISA, IFA-2 remains to attend the ceremony. ISA does not invite IFA-2, but instead, ISA attends the second ceremony. As long as the consumption supply is still adequate (not embarrassing), the presence of IFA-2 does not generate some problem to ISA; therefore, IFA-2’s presence can be conceived as surprising punishment to ISA, although it instead has increased reward favourable to him/her. The presence/attendance of IFA-2, actually unexpected by ISA, creates the second SEPRAP that is asymmetrical. In this second SEPRAP, ISA should have no
opportunity of getting a reward, but, in fact, the absence of punishment imposed by IFA-2 instead
gives ISA an opportunity of increasing his/her reward. In other words, the higher the punishment, the
lower is the reward. However, in reality, the lower reward is followed by lower punishment. It means
that ISA has a bigger opportunity of getting a reward, when punishment imposed by IFA-2 is getting
lower. Therefore, this second SEPRAP shows that the lower the punishment given by IFA-2, the higher
the reward ISA gets.

In the third quadrant, despite ISA’s invitation, IFA-2 does not attend the ceremony. ISA invites IFA-
2 to come to his/her second ceremony. To increase reward to ISA, IFA-2 is expected to attend his/her
first ceremony’s invitation. However, IFA-2 does not attend ISA’s invitation. This third SEPRAP is
an asymmetrical pattern, tending to lead to poor SEPRAP between both of them. As a result, when
seeing each other, they will tend to be silent or to express varying reasons (formal reason, forgetting,
to break Covid-19 chain, etc). In this third SEPRAP, if IFA-2 gives lower punishment, ISA should get
a higher reward. However, ISA’s expectation does not come true, and he/she instead gets higher
punishment from IFA-2 leading to lower or no reward. In this third SEPRAP, the higher is the
punishment given by IFA-2, the lower the reward ISA gets.

In the fourth quadrant, ISA does not invite IFA-2 and IFA-2 does not attend the ceremony. Indeed,
ISA does not invite IFA-2 in his/her second ceremony, and IFA-2 does not attend it. The neutral social
exchange pattern is created, ordinary attitude is expressed when seeing each other, and no prejudice
arises. This fourth SEPRAP creates an ideal SEPRAP that is symmetrical. ISA should not get a reward
(lower), because IFA-2 is not present in the second ceremony (high punishment). In an ideal SEPRAP,
the higher the punishment imposed by ISA, the lower is the reward received by ISA.

Furthermore, the inviter or the invited one’s decision to reply in the next social exchange in the third
ceremony will be highly dependent on the previous exchange pattern. Reward and punishment patterns
are the forms of giving and receiving or take and give (Gomes, 2007), as shown in Table 5.

**Table 5. Reward and punishment pattern constituting the form of giving and receiving**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Receiving</th>
<th>Giving</th>
<th>Giving</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Higher (giving) Reward</td>
<td>Lower (not giving) Reward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receiving</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower (never receiving)</td>
<td>Symmetrical and reciprocal</td>
<td>Asymmetrical relation, favourable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>punishment</td>
<td>relation.</td>
<td>to one actor only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High (having ever gotten)</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>punishment</td>
<td>Asymmetric relation that can</td>
<td>A symmetrical reciprocal relation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>worsen the established relation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the first quadrant, it can be seen that the higher the reward given by an individual, the lower the punishment he/she gets. It is an asymmetrical reciprocal relation. The second quadrant shows an individual neither giving reward nor getting punishment, meaning that the lower the reward, the lower is the punishment. It is an asymmetrical relation, favourable to one actor only. The third quadrant indicates an individual having ever given reward but instead gotten punishment, meaning that giving more means receiving more. Asymmetrical relation can worsen the established relationship. The fourth quadrant shows an individual having ever given a reward, but instead gotten punishment. This asymmetrical relation can worsen the established relation.

Furthermore, SEPRAP in all tables can be simplified as follows:

In the first SEPRAP, the lower the punishment given by ISA, the higher is the reward favorable to IFA-1 (Table 1); the lower the punishment given by ISA, the higher is the reward favorable to IFA-2 (Table 2); the lower the punishment given by IFA-1, the higher is the reward favorable to ISA (Table 3); the lower the punishment (none) given by IFA-2, the higher is the reward favorable to ISA (Table 4). Then, the four hypotheses result in a new hypothesis stating that the higher the reward given by an individual, the lower is the punishment the individual gets (Table 5).

In the second PPRSAP, the lower the punishment given by ISA, the higher the reward gotten by IFA-1 (Table 1); the lower the punishment given by ISA, the higher the reward obtained by IFA-2 (Table 2); the lower the punishment given by IFA-1, the higher is the reward favorable to ISA (Table 3); the lower is the punishment given by IFA-2, the higher is the reward obtained by ISA (Table 4). Then, the four hypotheses generate a new hypothesis stating that the lower the reward is given, the lower is the punishment received (Table 5).

In this third SEPRAP, the higher the reward obtained by IFA-1, the higher is the punishment given by ISA (Table 1); the higher the punishment given by ISA, the lower is the reward obtained by IFA-2 (Table 2); the higher the reward obtained by ISA, the higher is the punishment given by IFA-1 (Table 3); the higher the punishment given by IFA-2, the lower is the reward gotten by ISA (Table 4). Then, these four hypotheses result in new hypothesis stating that the higher the reward is given, the higher is the punishment is received.

The fourth SEPRAP, in the fourth quadrant, is a symmetrical or reciprocal relation. The hypotheses formulated are: the higher the punishment given by ISA, the lower is the reward obtained by IFA-1 (Table 1); the higher is the punishment given by ISA, the lower is thee reward received by IFA-2 (Table 2); the higher is the punishment given by IFA-1, the lower is the reward received by ISA (Table 3); the higher is the punishment given by ISA, the lower is the reward received by ISA (Table 4). Then, the four hypotheses generate a new hypothesis: the lower the reward, the higher is the punishment (giving less taking more) (Table 5).
Thus, reward and punishment patterns occurring in Surakarta City people (as shown in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4) are actually similar to take and give pattern (shown in Table 5).

As classified by Geertz (1983), the form of contribution to Javanese family in Surakarta City includes: cash, product and or service. This research founds the varying measurable size of cash contributed in Surakarta City people in this 20-year period (2000-2020) ranging between IDR 0 – and IDR 2,000,000. The amount of cash contributed can be identified to be dependent on social distance level involving friends, coworker (Jenkins, 2020), lineage, or kinship (Xu et al., 2020). The size of cash contribution from neighbor is IDR 20,000-IDR 30,000, from friends is IDR 50,000-IDR 500,000, from coworker is IDR 100,000-IDR 350,000, from family is IDR 500,000-IDR 2000,000. However, some of them are unidentifiable as it is an empty envelope without name, IDR 0,00.

The measurable activity of contributing to each other (sumbang-menyumbang) in the form of products supporting wedding ceremony including: egg, rice, sugar, tea, cooking oil, tempe, cabbage, noodle, bihun, and chili. The contribution can be product, the value of which is equalized to the certain nominal amount of money. These varying contributions are given mostly (78%) during, or before (8%), and after (4%) the ceremony.

Whether or not there is information given by the actor invited is interpreted as an indicator of the degree of attention to the invitation given. The presence (or merely entrusting contribution to another or being present physically) before, during, or after wedding is highly appreciated because it is interpreted as high degree of attention. However, being not present without notification or direct confirmation or merely via phone, WA or SMS, despite insignificant contribution, remains to have high degree of attention. Meanwhile, someone not present without confirmation at all is considered as having low degree of attention.

In this research about 40% of informants define social exchange as the fulfillment (Y. Wang et al., 2019) of social need or moral obligation to build togetherness or concord. The rest of about 30% informants define it as the time to get economic benefit (Peterson et al., 2019). About 20% of informants define it as the fulfillment of psychological need (adapting to tradition, the fear of being considered as abnormal). The rest of 10% informants define it as the fulfillment of religious obligation (Ahmadi et al., 2013) (Weiss, 2019) as human’s obligation to other humans getting pahala or reward, as it is conceived as good deed or amal sholeh. Social exchange pattern builds social bond, social trust (Shanka & Buvik, 2019) (Nunkoo & Ramkissoon, 2012) within society due to spiritual, personal, and kinship bonds and particularly based on lineage, place and thought. Patembyaan bond (the bond building on consensus or agreement and shared of interest and serving as the means only). The nominal amount of contribution is highly determined by close relationship. The contribution having ever been received will be repaid in at least the same or equal nominal amount in different time dimension. Disappointment can be seen when an individual having ever received contribution repay it in unequal amount (J. W. G, 1911) or less than that given before. Thus, the exchange actually has subjective -
pleasure or disappointed feeling (Kantor, 1923) and objective measures (nominal exchange value) with asymmetrical and symmetrical patterns, either reciprocal or non-reciprocal in nature. However, actually the exchange value that is accumulative in nature still needs further analysis, related to the receiving frequency or actually constituting contribution occurring to the same actor, disconnected or forwarded to different generation.

CONCLUSION
Social exchange between Surakarta people becomes moral duty to repay the contribution they have ever received at different time, in different wedding ceremonies moments, in different ways, with almost equal value, recalling that the contribution is given not for free, asymmetrical in nature, but always following the symmetrical social exchange logic pattern. Beginning to receive contribution means to begin to receive exchange pattern, evidently requiring a variety of sustainable reciprocities. The activity of contributing to wedding ceremonies performed by Surakarta City people is reproduced into tradition, as it is a habit to perpetuate the reciprocal exchange process along the two actor’s life within society and sent down to their offspring and descents.

Reciprocal exchange occurring between community members consists of: ordinary, proportional, and negative reciprocities. The activity of contributing to wedding ceremonies in Surakarta City is performed at home, in wedding reception hall, restaurant, or worship place. The contribution is given before, during, and after wedding ceremony. The contribution can be given in whether it is product, service, or money.

The size of contribution value is dependent on social relation pattern created, emotional closeness status of kinship (Berg, 2020), personal status, formal relation between two actors, and type of reciprocities. Considering economic dimension, this research becomes interesting because in fact proportionally, the values of contribution are different significantly. The real percentage of nominal contribution value is calculated based on the ratio of contribution value given to the take home pay income obtained from the givers. The real nominal amount given by actors with lower income to those with higher income is evidently higher than that given by actors with higher income to those with lower income.

In giving contribution, informants say the following: it is merely a sign of love, taking part of your happiness, continuing fraternity or *silaturahim*, just and helping buy porridge. The contribution is given before, during, and after the ceremony. Women usually participate actively before, during, and after the ceremony.

Social exchange in Surakarta is intended to contribution taker/giver in the *sumbang-menyumbang* activity conducted by many actors in some places, in different moments, and different forms. This activity has some dimensions expressed in different ways and functions. The function of contribution giving in social dimension is conceived as an attempt of building social concord, expanding social network, in economic dimension as an expression of benefit (Harris, 1983), in psychological
dimension as contribution value, with never equal quantity, but accumulatively and in combination it can be equalized.

Type and nominal amount of contribution in Surakarta are manifested into cash, product, and service. The amount of money obtained ranges between IDR 0 – and IDR 2,000,000, dependent on social distance level: neighbor (Hipp, 2020) (IDR 20,000-IDR 30,000), friends (IDR 50,000-IDR 500,000), coworker (IDR 100,000-IDR 350,000), family (IDR 500,000-IDR 2000,000); empty envelop (IDR 0,00).

Some of informants manifest their contribution into some help in providing catering, printing invitation, photograph or video documentation, souvenir, single organ music, bridal make-up, chair, and car, lodge or hotel, and etc. In addition, it can be manifested into food materials such as food, rice, sugar, tea, cooking oil, conceived as immeasurable commodity to support wedding ceremony. The contribution manifested into service defined as immeasurable sacrifice (Hannikainen et al., 2018) (Peck, 2019) can also be conducted before, during, and after wedding ceremony.

Social exchanges measured from economic dimensions tend to be contractual (C. L. Wang et al., 2015), resulting in unbalanced and fragile exchanges. The sustainability of social exchange needs to be improved by strengthening moral obligations.

Social exchange between the same actors (PAP and ISA) in fact has varying reward and punishment patterns in different periods of time, thereby creating four different SEPRAP. The actors with higher economic position (income or job stratification) should give higher nominal value to those with lower economic position. However, in fact, an unbalanced exchange manifested in this research shows that instead the actors give higher punishment (compared with the reward ever given). Meanwhile, the actors with lower position give nominal value proportionally relatively higher (reward than punishment) to those with higher position (Andersen et al., 2020) (Lee et al., 2019). Even some informants with higher income and job positions result in an increased accumulative punishment because they have repaid the contribution in the amount less than what they have received.

REFERENCES


