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IMPACTS OF THE PALESTINE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT DURING THE MAY 2021 WAR WITH THE ISRAELI FORCES ON PALESTINIAN POPULAR DISCOURSE

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ABSTRACT

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been going on for a long time and has garnered both local and international interest. Despite several efforts to find a solution by global leaders, the United Nations (UN), and other international organizations, it continues to continue unabated. This research, however, seeks to explore the impacts of the Palestinian resistance movement during the May 2021 Gaza War with the Israeli forces on Palestinian popular discourse. The research analyses a number of effects, including those on political dynamics, health, and the Middle Eastern security. This approach calls for the collection of data from both primary and secondary sources. In order to gather fresh information on the subject, semi-structured interviews are conducted with political analysts and reporters in person. The quest for a permanent peace in the area is still ongoing, but the study also suggests a two-state solution as potential peace-making option.

KEYWORDS: Palestine, Israel, Palestinian Cause, May 2021 Gaza War, Israeli Forces, Palestinian Resistance Movement, Palestinian Popular Discourse.

1. INTRODUCTION

The paper investigates the effects of the Palestinian Resistance movement during the conflict with the Israeli Forces in May 2021 and to determine and assess the actions that must be done to halt or lessen the conflict between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the Palestinian resistance movement. The influence of the Palestinian resistance movement during the confrontation with Israeli troops in May 2021 is examined in this qualitative study utilizing historical analysis and a case study.

The nations supported Israel's occupation of Palestine in order to address the Jewish issue in Europe and eliminate the danger posed by their economic development to the governments of eastern and western European nations. The Israeli military has been working relentlessly for 72 years and is still

trying to push the Palestinians off their land by whatever means necessary. This effort has finally resulted in the Palestinian resistance movement in May 2021. However, the international community, international tribunals, and key human rights organizations condemn these actions taken by the Israeli military. The implementation of the qualitative study to examine the effects of the Palestinian resistance movement on Israeli forces in May 2021 would aid Palestinians and people everywhere in understanding the full effect or impact of the Palestinian resistance movement.

Beginning around the end of the nineteenth century, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has existed. The partition plan, also known as Resolution 181 (United Nations, 1947) aimed to create separate Arab and Jewish nations inside the British Mandate of Palestine. The State of Israel was established on May 14, 1948, which precipitated the first Arab-Israeli War. Israel won the war in 1949, but 750,000 Palestinians were forced from their homes, and the region was split into three parts: The State of Israel, the West Bank (west of the Jordan River), and the Gaza Strip.

The paper assesses how the Palestinian resistance movement affected Palestinian public discourse during the conflict with Israeli soldiers in May 2021. It all started with a significant number of distinct but related occurrences in Jerusalem's eastern neighborhood, which multiplied into the development of various levels of conflict and crisis that had been simmering for years. One of the main causes of the violence between the two sides occurred at the Damascus Gate entrance to Jerusalem's old city during Ramadan when Israeli officials forbade eastern Jerusalem residents from congregating there and went so far as to block the area.

Palestinians began the second Intifada in 2000, which would last until 2005. It was partly sparked by Palestinian complaints about Israel's control over the West Bank, a stalled peace process, and former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's visit to the al-Aqsa mosque, the third holiest site in Islam. In response, the Israeli government authorized building a wall around the West Bank in 2002, in defiance of the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC).

For many Palestinians, the gate functioned as a gathering point where different social and cultural activities could take place. Although these protests at the time were in no way connected to any political factions or interference, the youth (Palestinian) saw the arrangement of the barricades and what was happening as a sign of provocation that eventually led to various degrees of protests. A few days later, ultra-nationalists reacted to these protests by marching towards the Damascus gates and chanting various slogans like "Death to all Arabs." This led to countless attacks on Palestinians, many of which were uploaded on social media sites like Twitter and Facebook.

Other factors that contributed to the May 2021 violence between Palestinians and Israeli soldiers were difficulties with Israel's highest court's delayed decision. The case concerned the deportation of four Palestinian families from Sheikh Jarrah, a nearby neighborhood in Jerusalem's eastern outskirts that connects to the West Bank. Another factor or trigger that led to the conflict and resistance movement

of Palestinians was the president's decision to postpone legislative elections in Palestinian authorities until further notice or indefinitely, citing reasons such as the lack of assurances from the Israeli populace and that people in eastern Jerusalem would be allowed to vote in the elections. This resulted in further complications and tension between both parties.

The influence of the Palestinian resistance movement during the confrontation with Israeli troops in May 2021 is examined in this qualitative study utilizing historical analysis and a case study. A chronology of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict's history, a history of Israel/Palestine at the UN, and the role of the World Health Organization (WHO) are presented to put this research into perspective. The causes of the Palestinian resistance movement and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are then discussed politically. Then, a thorough examination of the movement's varied impacts is conducted using a variety of data gathered from both primary sources via semi-structured face-to-face interviews with political reporters and analytical specialists and from secondary sources via literature review of articles, press releases, books, and reports. The research employs historical analysis, case study and content analysis to examine the qualitative data that was gathered.

2. Impact on the Security of the Middle East

2.1 Origin of the security issues in the Middle East

Today, the Middle East is regarded as one of the world's least stable regions. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the primary reason causing this state of affairs, even though a peace process was started in the 1990s, this dispute has not yet been settled. Due to the difficulty of the issue and the demands that both parties must make in order to achieve a permanent peace, all mediation and negotiating efforts have come to a standstill. The creation of a Palestinian state has persisted, although the peace process has been delayed by a series of crises between Palestine and Israel (Teska, 2012).

Even though both parties have stated repeatedly that they are eager to pick up the peace talks, the dialogues keep failing because of the standards that each party sets for the other. Even before the creation of the Jewish state, tensions between the Arab and Jewish communities began to arise, major events started to happen between the two groups as early as the 1920s. In reality, the Arab-Israeli conflict has only existed since the creation of the State of Israel.

The UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (1947), which suggested dividing the mandate between Jewish and Arab governments and placing Jerusalem under international control, was a turning point in this dispute (Iqtaid, 2017). The proposal for dividing Palestine was put into effect by the resolution. Parts of western Galilee, West Bank, the city of Jaffa, as well as a strip of territory along the Mediterranean Sea and a strip of land along the border with Egypt, would all be included in the imagined Arab kingdom. Roughly 70% of the people living in the Mandate of Palestine called these territories home, they made up about 43% of the total area. In contrast, the distinct city of Jerusalem and its surrounding villages and towns were to make only 1% of the Mandate area, which was populated in about equal amounts by Jews and Arabs. The remaining 56% of the Mandate area, which

was populated by about 30% of Palestinians, was to become the Jewish state. All three parts were to be joined by an economic union, including common customs duties and a currency system (Nowacka et al., 2020, p. 9).

The passage of this resolution, which was embraced by the Zionist movement and rejected by the Arab side, intensified the continuing confrontation between the two parties to the level of a local civil war. On May 14, 1948, the Jewish side announced the creation of the State of Israel, citing the aforementioned decision. According to Kacki (1999, p. 11), this day is regarded as the official start of the first Arab-Israeli war “Al-Nakba”, sometimes known as the “War of Independence”.

However, it should be emphasized that there were attacks by Arab forces on the Jewish people beginning in November 1947, around six months prior to the day Israel was proclaimed. These assaults mostly targeted Jewish villages close to Lod, the seaside strip between Tel Aviv and Haifa, and the major crossroads for Jewish colonies. Additionally, such activities were followed by large-scale Arab protests to express opposition to the creation of the new state. In particular, the Arabs desired control of the British-controlled Palestinian Mandate Areas (Orowski, 2014, pp. 5–6). Outlining the disputed points that the parties to the disagreement would have to settle is important when explaining the cause of the conflict.

2.2 Middle Eastern States and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Six of Middle Eastern states—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria—entered the conflict with the newly established State of Israel in 1948, to establish an Arab state in Palestine, these governments want to eliminate Israel. The behaviour of the administration in Cairo serves as the best example of this, Egypt made the decision to ratify a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, it reclaimed the Sinai Peninsula as a consequence.

The Cairo government made an effort to bring up the Palestinian problem during the discussions. The establishment of a Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as a stop to the growth of Jewish settlements, were both agreed upon by the parties. However, it turned out that the signatories read these clauses differently. No action was taken by the Cairo government to compel Tel Aviv to support Palestine (Chojnowski&Tomaszewski, 2000, p. 108).

Later, the Egyptian government continued to work with Israel despite its vocal support for Palestine, for example in the Gaza Strip's dismantling of subterranean tunnels and gas supplies. Only at the start of the so-called Arab Spring, when the Muslim Brotherhood won the 2012 presidential elections, did the situation alter. The new administration reduced relations with Israel and increased collaboration with Palestine. For instance, it chose to halt gas shipments to Israel (Teska, 2012, pp. 71-86).

Jordan opted to sign a peace agreement with Israel in 1994, making it the second nation to do so. The Jordanians highlight their support for Palestine, much like the administration in Cairo does, but they

do not exert any pressure on the Israeli government. Recalling the Jordanian envoy in protest of the conduct of Jewish extremists on Al-Aqsa Mosque was a show of sympathy with the Palestinian population (Welsh, 2014).

Syria, the sole nation to back Palestinian claims after 1967, also backed Palestine, particularly by aiding Palestinian forces who attacked Israeli targets. The strategy for dealing with the Palestinian issue, however, experienced a fundamental shift once Hafez Assad became office. Palestinian paramilitary groups operating in Syria were under to severe surveillance by the Syrian government, and they were not allowed to attack Israel (Zdanowski, 2010, pp. 248-249).

Iran, which has chosen to oppose Israel since 1979 and help the Palestinians in several ways, likewise backs Palestine. Thousands of Iranians take part in solidarity marches every year, Tehran has provided significant funding to support numerous Palestinian groups. It's important to note that the help didn't just come in the form of money. Specifically, the Iranians provided weaponry and training to Hamas members, among others (Szyszlak, 2016, pp. 134-135). The Gulf nations have sided with the Palestinians as well. For instance, Qatar has provided financial support to Palestinian groups. On the other side, Saudi Arabia has made an effort to mediate peace between the various Palestinian groups in an effort to establish a Palestinian national unity government.

Turkiye supports the Palestinian cause despite the country's extensive prior cooperation with Israel. Nine Turkish citizens, who were at the so-called "Freedom Flotilla"-Gaza Flotilla (Blue Marmara) died as a result of this choice. Israel did not express regret for this episode until 2013, however, and it was not until 2016 that relations between Israel and Turkey were restored (Ravid, 2016).

2.3 The Palestinian resistance movement and the Security of the Middle Eastern States

Various data demonstrates unequivocally that while the Middle Eastern nations support and advocate for the Palestinian side, no firm and decisive steps have been done in this direction. Long-term experience enables us to draw the conclusion that these nations have minimal impact on the nature and condition of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Therefore, it should be taken into account that the effect of Middle Eastern powers on the conflict is minimal, with the exception of diplomatic activities at the United Nations (2016) or performed mediation during significant confrontations in the Gaza Strip (Szyszlak, 2016, p. 136).

Because of all of this, the Palestinian resistance movement does not pose a significant danger to the security of Middle Eastern governments, it is believed that the advent of the so-called Islamic State poses a considerably bigger threat. Many people believe that the dispute at hand is solely an internal one, which is why the other nations in the region have chosen to handle it diplomatically. This demonstrates that the Israeli-Palestinian issue is becoming less significant every year, which indicates that it will not have an impact on these nations' internal affairs or prompt the Middle Eastern governments to adopt more drastic measures.

Along with diplomatic assurances from Middle Eastern nations, it is to be anticipated that anti-Israeli nations like Iran and those of the Persian Gulf will increase their financial support for Palestine. The stability of the Jewish state and the ability of its forces to reduce and restrict the effects of a future Palestinian uprising on Israel's ability to operate are further factors that lower the possibility of a security threat to Middle Eastern governments (Szyszlak, 2016, p. 142).

In conclusion, the Middle East is currently regarded as one of the least stable regions in the whole globe. The Palestinian resistance movement that occurred in May 2021 is the primary reason causing this state of affairs. There hasn't been a resolution to this dispute yet, despite the fact that both parties have frequently expressed a desire to restart negotiations for peace, the standards they set for one another cause the conversations to fail. Due to all of these factors, the dispute presents difficulties and dangers to the security of the parties involved as well as a source of ongoing stress in the area. Even before the creation of the Jewish state, tensions between the Arab and Jewish communities began to rise at the same time. On May 14, 1948, the State of Israel proclaimed its independence, which is when the first Arab-Israeli war is thought to have started.

Various research shows that there is a lack of forceful and decisive action in this area, despite the fact that nations in the Middle East region support and advocate for the Palestinian side. All of this indicates that the security of Middle Eastern nations is not significantly threatened by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is believed that the advent of the so-called Islamic State poses a considerably bigger threat. Many people believe that this issue is only an internal one, which is why the other nations in the region are behaving quite discreetly. This demonstrates that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is becoming less severe with each passing year, which implies that it won't have an impact on these nations' internal affairs or prompt the Middle Eastern governments to take more decisive action.

3. Impact on Health

The Palestinian resistance movement/conflict with Israeli forces has badly affected the people's health in both Israel and the West Bank and Gaza. First, the health of the Palestinians will be assessed, then that of the Israelis, the State of Palestine Ministry of Health's 2016 report for the sixty-ninth World Health Assembly on the "Health conditions in the occupied Palestinian territory, including east Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan" describes the state of health, the availability of healthcare. There has also been the need to take necessary steps to increase healthcare access and administration quality, the statement that "the health sector has experienced enormous problems as a result of the impact of the Israeli occupation on the Palestinian people and Palestinian institutions" is also repeated in this passage (Awwad, 2016).

Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Gaza	5	3.9	4.08	4	3.1	3.3	3.2	2.9	3	22.7
West Bank	2.6	2.8	3	3.1	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.5	1	0

Figure 1. Mortality Rates in Palestinian Territories (2005-2014)

Source: Siegel, 2016

With a noticeable rise between 2008 and 2009 and 2013 and 2014, the death rates above exhibit a generally consistent trend. The conflicts between Israel forces and Palestine resistance movement in 2008 and 2014 are probably to blame for this. However, even though “Operation Pillar of Defense” was conducted against Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip in 2012, the fatality rate did not considerably rise during that year.

Even though there is frequently violence in Gaza and the West Bank, fatalities from violence are not among the leading causes of mortality. Instead, cardiovascular disease (29.5% of recorded deaths), cancer (14.2%), strokes (11.3%), diabetes (8.9%), respiratory diseases (5.4%), perinatal mortality (5.2%), accidents due to multiple causes (5.2%), renal failure (3.9%), and infectious diseases (3.3%) were the main causes of death in Palestine in 2014 (Awwad, 2016, p. 9). Many of these causes are caused by noncommunicable diseases, indicating that these nations have advanced more than those that are largely affected by communicable diseases like TB in terms of development (Siegal, 2016a). However, in 2014 Israeli war on Gaza, more than 2322 Palestinians, including 578 children, 489 women and 102 aged were killed in more than 60,664 air, land and sea Israeli strikes. Meanwhile, around 11,000 Palestinians were injured. In the same war, 72 Israelis were killed, 2522, including 740 soldiers, were injured (Anatolian Agency, 2016).

In Israel, the top ten killers are ischemic heart disease (10.8% of recorded deaths), stroke (5.8%), diabetes mellitus (5.7%), Alzheimer's and other dementias (5.3%), trachea/bronchus/lung cancers (4.9%), kidney diseases (3.7%), colon and rectum cancers (3.6%), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (2.8%), breast cancer (2.6%), and lower respiratory infections (2.4%) (WHO, 2015).


Hostilities in Gaza substantially increased in May 2021 as a result of the Palestinian resistance movement. Over the course of 11 days, 261 Palestinians, all of them victims of Israeli attacks, including 41 women, 67 children, and three individuals with disabilities, there were at least 2,200 Palestinians hurt. Palestinian armed organizations fired missiles into Israel, killing 10 Israeli citizens and residents and injuring 710 (Akram, 2021).

Regarding Israel's adherence to the international humanitarian law standards of distinction, proportionality, and prudence, there were grave concerns. These worries were sparked by a significant number of civilian deaths, significant destruction of civilian property and infrastructure, the deployment of explosive weapons with wide-area impacts in densely populated regions, and the seeming lack of any clear military goals (Gelvin, 2021). Multiple human rights have been violated by Israel's continuous employment of collective punishment methods that are specifically forbidden by international humanitarian law. As it reached its fifteenth year, the siege of Gaza continued to have a very negative effect on the rights of the whole civilian population.

Israeli authorities continued to carry out punitive home demolitions in the West Bank, including eastern part of Jerusalem, of Palestinians who had carried out or were allegedly responsible for assaults against Israelis. Women and children were disproportionately impacted by this collective punishment. Additionally, 23 other Palestinians, who were murdered by Israeli security forces during this time had their remains withheld by Israeli authorities. These victims included children (Judah, 2021).

Compared to the preceding reporting period, the number of Palestinians killed by Israeli Security Forces during law enforcement operations more than quadrupled. In comparison to the previous reporting period, when 23 Palestinians were slain, 74 were killed by Israeli security forces, including 17 youngsters and three women. Several instances when Israeli Security Forces (IDF) employed deadly force when less drastic measures or the absence of a danger called for fatal action were also documented by my office. It is quite concerning when force is used unlawfully and no one is held accountable for it (Sokol, 2021).

There are oppressive actions taken by the Israeli government against civil society. Six well-known Palestinian human rights and humanitarian organizations were labelled "terrorist organizations" by Israeli authorities on May 2021 based on speculative and unproven charges. Additionally, Israel arbitrarily detained and prosecuted human rights advocates, including female advocates. It curtailed people's freedom of movement, searched and shut down civil society organizations, disrupted peaceful protests, attacked journalists, and constrained online public space. In comparison to the previous reporting period, there were also noticeably more administrative prisoners and Palestinian youngsters imprisoned by Israel. Unsettlingly, gender-based violence—including online abuse—remains pervasive in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem.



Graph 2. Number of Rockets/Mortar fired by Hamas and PIJ against Israel from 2014 to 16 May 2021

[Source: Author's compilation of data from the Jewish Virtual Library at ACE]zo

Figure 2. Number of rockets/mortars fired against Israel (2014-May 2021)

Source: Taylor, A. (2021): "Photo Essay: Violence Across Israel and Gaza", Access Date: 21.05.2021, Web Address: <https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2021/05/photos-violence-explodes-across-israel-and-gaza/618863/>

3. Impact on Political Dynamics

Israel appears to have suffered a lot of setbacks as a result of the fighting in May 2021. First of all, it was unable to tactically destroy Hamas, much less control its rocket firing on an operational level (Akram, 2021). Its deterrent could not have been increased by such an outcome. Thus, it appears that there is a significant disconnect between the statements made by top Israeli authorities that their goal in the battle was "to modify the deterrence equation" with respect to Hamas and the actual situation. There is no proof that the IDF's attempt to persuade Palestinian resistance movement that the IDF had won the "round" decisively through its post-battle public relations operation. On the contrary, Hamas's head in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, went to great lengths to show that Hamas was not afraid by appearing in public and above ground right after the fierce combat finished. Israelis living close to the most severe fire, i.e., in the western Negev or the so-called "Gaza envelope" region, do not appear to believe that any fundamental difference in the equation was achieved (Taylor, 2021).

Many of them were convinced that either the resistance movement had not been deterred or that whatever deterrence that had been obtained was tactical—and hence short-lived—and that another significant military conflict between Israel and Hamas (Katman, 2018) in Gaza was imminent. Israelis living in the south, who are more detail-oriented than any other population, have also noted over time how Israel has dramatically weakened its deterrence when it comes to the actual implementation of policy toward Hamas. It has achieved this by negotiating with Hamas (Katman, 2020) while claiming that it is not involved in such talks, assisting the transfer of Qatari funds to Hamas, and concluding very generous deals with Hamas, such as the Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange agreement, under the terms of which Israel released 1,027 Palestinians (far more generous than anything it has ever granted the Palestinian Authority-PA).

May 2021 saw the continuation of the "David versus Goliath" narrative that favoured Israel as representing the numerically "few" standing up to the "many" Arabs between 1947 and 1967. This narrative favored Israel as representing the "few" standing up to the "many" Arabs due to the dramatic asymmetry in the balance of power between it and Hamas, which was manifested in the three previous significant violent confrontations between the two sides since late 2008 (Federman, 2021).

The extent of the destruction was an expression of this asymmetry, and the widespread publication of numerous images of it (documented by anyone in Gaza with a cell phone) further weakened support for Israel in progressive circles in Europe and the United States, particularly among Democrats and American Jews. 30% of Americans between the ages of 18 and 34, who participated in a University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll conducted from June 22 to July 21 blamed Israel for the conflict, compared to only 20% who blamed the Palestinians (Ahronheim and Zonshine, 2021).

Another interesting finding is that, of all Democrats who responded, 35% blamed Israel for the conflict while just 8% blamed the Palestinians, with 53% holding both parties equally responsible. The divergent opinions held by Republicans, of whom 59% blamed the Palestinians and only 4% blamed Israel, with 31% blaming both parties, demonstrate how political this issue has become (Fields, 2017). While regional realities framing the larger context of the Arab-Israeli conflict changed dramatically in Israel's favour and against the Palestinians during this time, they did so within the context of the bilateral relations between Hamas and Israel, where the former made some gains and the latter suffered some losses in the May 2021 violence. Domestic circumstances in Israel and among the Palestinians also made it difficult for the outcomes of May 2021 to result in any appreciable improvement for the Palestinians (Hamid, 2021).

In reality, the regional climate during the conflict in May 2021 was even less pro-Palestinian than it had been during the three previous rounds of warfare between Hamas and Israel. The tendency to accommodate the Jewish state that started with the 1978 Egypt-Israel Camp David Accords and their 1979 peace treaty, the 1993 Israel-PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) Oslo Accords, and the 1994 Jordan-Israel peace treaty was solidified less than a year earlier with the signing of various

normalization agreements with Israel by four Arab states, namely the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan.

Additionally, there was broad agreement in the region that, despite Saudi Arabia's lack of formal participation in the Abraham Accords, its encouragement and covert assistance were crucial in influencing the choices Bahrain and the UAE made. It was also apparent that the four Arab signatories to the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative dropped the plan's conditionality, which was a violation of the plan's logic as well as its substance. Israel was not required to take any other actions in the Palestinian-Israeli context to benefit from the Abraham Accords, aside from refraining from annexing additional portions of the West Bank (Hamid, 2021). This was a strategic gain of monumental significance in comparison to whatever gains Hamas may have made on behalf of the Palestinians in May 2021.

Furthermore, the Arab nations who supported agreement with Israel made it quite clear that they would not be swayed from their chosen route by the unrest in May 2021. The signatories to the Abraham Accords continued to carry out their commitments to the agreed process during this time, from Bahrain's first ambassador presenting his credentials to Israel's president to Morocco following the UAE in agreeing to start direct daily flights from Israel, while reiterating their general sympathy for the Palestinians and discomfort with the images of destruction in Gaza.

On the popular level, the Israeli war on Gaza in May 2021 was an incentive for many youths, especially the new generations, to show their support and sympathy for the Palestinian cause. Many celebrities and social media influencers showed their support for Palestine in their own way. At the time, this wide spread of the accelerating events on the Palestinian scene was helped by many photos and videos coming from Jerusalem, most of which focused mainly on the two brothers Muhammad and Mona Al-Kurd, whose family was threatened with eviction from their home in the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood. All of these changes were sparked by a regional reality that the Palestinians find to be extremely inconvenient. Arab politics and administrations have been more inward-looking since the Arab Spring began in 2011, concentrating on internal issues. As a result, they no longer give the Palestinian cause nearly as much weight as they formerly did. The fall of Muammar Qaddafi in 2011 and Saddam Hussein in 2003, as well as the civil war in Syria after Qaddafi's fall in 2011, also resulted in a considerable loss of support for the Palestinians from outside. A further loss of broader Arab sympathy resulted from their own internal strife, which was sharply exhibited by Hamas's violent takeover of Gaza in 2007 and the failure of all Arab efforts to secure genuine cooperation from Hamas or Fatah for implementing internal reconciliation.

Additionally, Palestinian resistance movement were unable to gain anything meaningful from the conflict in May on a worldwide scale. The United States (US) House of Representatives gave Israel \$1 billion in late September to restock its Iron Dome air defense interceptor supply, despite some criticism of Israel from progressive groups in the US. The vote showed that congressional support for

Israel is still strong and nonpartisan, with 420 members of Congress voting in favor and only 9 against (Hamid, 2021).

The domestic situations on both sides of the conflict are a factor that lowers the likelihood that Israel-Hamas ties will significantly improve. It was highly improbable that the Israeli government could fulfil the minimal conditions to reduce the intensity of the conflict with Hamas -a movement that continues to be committed to destroying the occupiers (Israel) and expel them from the Palestinian land- given that it had been dominated by right-wing parties for the previous 12 years. Similar paralysis results from the bizarre coalition of right- and left-wing parties that makes up Israel's present government. Such a government must not make any risky choices if it is to survive.

While it appears that Hamas has gained some ground on the internal Palestinian front against Fatah, the two weeks of violence and the severe cost to Gaza's inhabitants have not seemed to have any impact on Hamas ties with Israel or the everyday suffering of Gazans. Sadly, it is just a matter of time until another explosion occurs given the continued horrible living circumstances in Gaza and the absence of any major change that might be sparked in the international, regional, or domestic arenas (Hamid, 2021).

4. CONCLUSION

The confrontation in May 2021 was the fourth significant escalation of hostilities between Israel and the Palestinians in less than 13 years. Initially, the Strip was used as a launchpad for attacks against Israel after Israel's 2005 unilateral departure from Gaza, which was followed by Hamas' 2006 victory in the Palestinian elections and its defeat of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in Gaza in 2007. The first significant confrontation began in 2008–2009 as a result of the Israeli blockade of Gaza Strip that followed by frequent rocket fire, abduction raids, and other assaults. To stop Hamas rocket launchers, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched airstrikes and an expensive ground invasion.

Israel and the Palestinians engaged in intense gunfire exchanges over 12 days in May 2021. In deciding how to react to assaults, politicians balanced offensive and defensive capabilities, as shown by the number of casualties: A total of 260 Palestinians, 3 foreign workers, 10 Israelis, and several others were murdered. The displacement of Palestinian households from Sheikh Jarrah, a neighborhood in the eastern part of Jerusalem that Israel seized in 1967, and the gradual increase in the number of Jews permitted by Israeli authorities to worship on Al-Aqsa Mosque appeared to have been the immediate causes of this round of violence.

Inaction on the part of the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) in the face of these events encouraged Hamas and gave it a chance to position itself as the protector of Palestinian and Arab rights in Jerusalem. Israel seems to have suffered a lot of setbacks as a consequence of the fighting in May 2021. First of all, it was unable to tactically destroy Hamas, much less control its rocket firing on an operational level. Its deterrent could not have been increased by such an outcome. Thus, it seems that

there is a significant disconnect between the statements made by top Israeli authorities that their goal in the battle was "to modify the deterrence equation" with respect to Hamas and the actual situation. The "David against Goliath" narrative, which portrayed Israel as the numerically "few" that defeated the "many" Arabs between 1947 and 1967, was continued in May 2021. Because Israel was numerically "few" in relation to the "many" Arabs, this story favored them as the "few" standing up to the "many." The scale of the damage was a manifestation of this disparity, and the widespread publication of several photos of it (captured by any Gazan with a mobile phone) eroded support for Israel in liberal circles in Europe and the United States, notably among "American Jews".

While regional realities that have shaped the broader context of the Arab-Israeli dispute have drastically changed during this time in Israel's favor as opposed to the Palestinians, they have done so in the context of the bilateral ties between Hamas and Israel, where the aforementioned made some benefits and the latter did suffer some damages in the May 2021 conflict. Domestic circumstances in Israel and among the Palestinians also made it difficult for the outcomes of May 2021 to result in any appreciable improvement for the Palestinians.

In reality, the regional climate during the conflict in May 2021 was even less pro-Palestinian than it had been during the three previous rounds of warfare between Hamas and Israel. The tendency to accommodate the Jewish state that started with the 1978 Egypt-Israel Camp David Accords and their 1979 peace treaty, the 1993 Israel-PLO Oslo Accords, and the 1994 Jordan-Israel peace treaty was solidified less than a year earlier with the signing of various normalization agreements with Israel by four Arab states: the "UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan".

Additionally, there was broad agreement in the region that, despite Saudi Arabia's lack of official participation in the Abraham Accords, its encouragement and covert assistance were crucial in influencing the choices Bahrain and the UAE made. It was also apparent that the four Arab signatories to the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative dropped the plan's conditionality, which was a violation of the plan's logic as well as its content. With the exception of not annexing further of the West Bank, Israel was under no obligation to take any other steps in the Palestinian-Israeli context to profit from the Abraham Accords. In compared to whatever achievements Hamas may have gained on behalf of the Palestinians in May 2021, this was a strategic victory of tremendous importance.

Furthermore, the Arab nations that supported agreement with Israel made it quite clear that they would not be swayed from their chosen route by the unrest in May 2021. While affirming their overall support for the Palestinians and unpleasantness with the images of devastation in Gaza, the parties involved to the Abraham Accords continued to fulfil out their obligations to the agreed process, from Bahrain's first ambassador displaying his credentials to Israel's president to Morocco following the UAE in making an agreement to start direct daily flights from Israel.

Globally, Palestinians were unable to gain anything meaningful from the conflict in May on a worldwide scale. The US House of Representatives gave Israel \$1 billion in late September to restock its Iron Dome air defense interceptor supply, despite some criticism of Israel from progressive groups in the US. The vote showed that congressional support for Israel is still strong and nonpartisan, with 420 members of Congress voting in favor and just 9 against.

At the popular level, after the events of Sheikh Jarrah in the eastern part of Jerusalem, which were followed by the events of the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip, the Palestinians gained wide global popular sympathy, which was reflected on social media, and many marches were launched in a number of capitals of the world. In addition to demonstrations in many cities in different countries in support of the Palestinian resistance, and in rejection of the Israeli violations against the Palestinian people in the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.

The internal situations on both sides of the conflict are one reason that lowers the likelihood that Israel-Palestine relations will significantly improve. Considering that it had been ruled by right-wing parties for the past 12 years, it seemed exceedingly unlikely that the Israeli government could meet the necessary requirements to ease the conflict with Hamas. Similar paralysis results from the bizarre coalition of right- and left-wing parties that makes up Israel's present government. Such a government must not make any dramatic choices if it wants to survive.

Palestinians have a unique home obstacle. With respect to ad hoc practical difficulties, it has numerous pragmatic understandings and agreements with Israel that are not hindered by its philosophy. But for there to be a deeper, larger, and longer-lasting accord with Israel, Palestine would have to give up its ideological opposition to the Jewish state. All internal roads appear to lead to the prolonged stagnation in Israel-Hamas ties, whether it be because Hamas officials are philosophically committed to their stance or because they are afraid that the change necessary will portray them as following in Fatah's footsteps.

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